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Microbes providing public goods are widespread in nature despite running the risk of being exploited by
free-riders. However, the precise ecological factors supporting cooperation are still puzzling. Following
recent experiments, we consider the role of population growth and the repetitive fragmentation of
populations into new colonies mimicking simple microbial life-cycles. Individual-based modeling reveals
that demographic fluctuations, which lead to a large variance in the composition of colonies, promote
cooperation.Biasedbypopulationdynamicsthesefluctuationsresultintwoqualitativelydistinctregimesof
robust cooperation under repetitive fragmentation into groups. First, if the level of cooperation exceeds a
threshold, cooperators will take over the whole population. Second, cooperators can also emerge from a
single mutant leading to a robust coexistence between cooperators and free-riders. We find frequency and
size of population bottlenecks, and growth dynamics to be the major ecological factors determining the
regimes and thereby the evolutionary pathway towards cooperation.
O
ne pivotal question in evolutionary biology is the emergence of cooperative traits and their sustainment
in the presence of free-riders
1–6. By providing a public good, cooperative behavior of every single
individual would be optimal for the entire population. However, non-contributing free-riders may take
evolutionary advantage by saving the costs for providing the benefit and hence jeopardize the survival of the
whole population. In evolutionary theory kin selection
1,7–9, multi-level selection
10–13, and reciprocity
14 have been
found to provide conceptual frameworks to resolve the dilemma
4–6. For higher developed organisms, stable
cooperation is generally traced back to specific mechanisms like repeated interaction
2,14, punishment
15,16, and
kin discrimination
1,6,17,18. But how can cooperation emerge in the first place and be maintained without abilities
likememoryorrecognition?Answeringthisquestionisespeciallyimportantwithintheexpandingfieldofbiofilm
formation
19–24. There, a successfully cooperating collective of microbes runs the risk to be undermined by non-
producing strains saving the metabolically costly supply of biofilm formation
18,20,23,24. Sophisticated social beha-
vior cannot be presumed to explain the high level of cooperation observed in nature and experiments
18–20,24–31.
Instead, different forms of limited dispersal, such as spatial arrangements, or fragmentation into groups are
essentialtoresolvethedilemmaofcooperationamongsuchmicrobialorganisms
1,32,33.Indeed,innaturemicrobes
typically live in colonies and biofilms. Remarkable, although details strongly differ from species to species, most
microbial populations follow a life-cycle of colony initiation, maturation, maintenance and dispersal leading
to new initiation, see e.g.
24,34–37. Well-studied examples include Pseudomonas aeruginosa
38, Escherichia coli
39,
Bacillus subtilis
40 and Myxococcus xanthus
41. Even though such a life-cycle is often complexly regulated e.g. by
environmental impacts and including collective behavior of colonies, populations bottlenecks alternating with
growth phases are essential components of most microbial life-cycles. Employing simplified setups, recent
experimentsaddresstheroleofpopulation bottlenecksandgrowthbystudyingstructured microbialpopulations
of cooperators and free-riders
25,26,28,29,31. In these setups small founder colonies differing in composition were
cultivated in separate habitats. For example, Chuang et al.
29used 96-well plates as structured environment with a
dilution of synthetically designed E.coli strains where the cooperative strain is producer of a public good
provoking antibiotic resistance. A microbial life-cycle was generated in the lab by regularly mixing all colonies
after a certain time and inoculating new cultures. Under these conditions, an increase in the overall level of
cooperation was observed even though free-riders have a growth advantage within every colony. However, the
preciseconditionsunderwhichcooperationisfavoredaresubtle
8,9,11,13,31,33,42–49.Apossibletheoreticalexplanation
for the observed increase in cooperation is the antagonism between two levels of selection, as widely discussed in
the literature
12. Here, these levels, intra- and inter-group evolution, arise as population dynamics alternates
between independent evolution in subpopulations (groups) and global competition in a merged well-mixed
population. Due to the dilemma of cooperation, free-riders are always better off than cooperators within each
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groups with a higher fraction of cooperators are favored over groups
with a lower one.
In this article, we study the interplay between the dynamics at the
intra- and inter-group evolution and how it may provoke the main-
tenanceoreventheemergenceofcooperation. Weproposeageneric
individual-based model which includes three essential elements: a
growthdisadvantageofcooperatorswithineachgroup,anadvantage
of groups incorporating more cooperative individuals, and regularly
occurringregroupingevents;cf.Fig.1.Well-knownfromthetheories
ofkin
1,7,9,49andmulti-levelselection
12,29,49,50,cooperationcanincrease
in principle: While, within a group i, the fraction of cooperators, ji,
decreases, groups also change their size, ui, such that the fraction of
cooperators in the total population, given by the weighted average,
x~
P
iniji=
P
ini, may still increase. Such an increase is an example
of Simpson’s paradox
29. To occur, a decreasing fraction of coopera-
tors,ji,withingroupsmustbecompensated bychanging weights,ui/
N, in the total population of size N~
P
ini, i.e. by a sufficiently high
positive correlation between a group’s size and its fraction of coop-
erators
50. Here we want to go beyond stating this mathematical fact
and reveal the ecological factors underlying these correlations. To
this end the full stochastic dynamics at the intra- and inter-group
level will be analyzed. A key element will be the intricate coupling
between the dynamics of the composition and the dynamics of the
overallsizeofagroup.Thisappliesinparticulartomicrobialpopula-
tions where the reproduction rate of microbes strongly depends on
environmentalconditionsandtherebyalsoonthecompositionofthe
population
51. Therefore, a proper theoretical formulation has to
account for a dynamics in the group size
52,53 rather than assuming
it to be constant as in most classical approaches
54–56. Such a dynamic
formulation will allow us to investigate ecological mechanisms for
the evolution and maintenance of cooperation.
Motivated by microbial life-cycles
24,34–37 and the aforementioned
experiments
25,26,28,29,31, we consider a population of cooperators and
free-riders and its evolution in a repetitive cycle consisting of three
consecutive steps
33, cf. Fig. 1. In the group formation step, the total
population with a fraction of cooperators, x0, is divided into a set of
M groups by an unbiased stochastic process such that the group size
and the fraction of cooperation vary statistically with mean values n0
and x0, respectively. Subsequently, the groups evolve independently
(groupevolutionstep).Ineachgroup,boththefractionofcooperators
and the group size vary dynamically and change over time.
Independent of the specific details, the groups’ internal dynamics
has the following characteristic features: First, because of the costs
for providing the benefit, cooperators have a selection disadvantage,
s,compared tocheaters inthesamegroup. Inparticular, cooperators
reproduceslowerthancheatersandhencethefractionofcooperators
decreases within each group (intra-group evolution). Second, con-
sidering the benefit of cooperation, groups with more cooperators
growfasterandcanreachahighermaximumsize(carryingcapacity)
than groups of mainly cheaters (inter-group evolution)
52,53. The
benefit of cooperators is implemented by the growth rate of an
individual proportional to (1 1 pji(t)), where ji(t) is the fraction of
cooperators in the group the individual belongs to. Resource-limited
logistic growth is considered by a death term depending on the group
size. For specificity we assume growth conditions comparable to those
observed by Chuang et al.
29. Details are given in the materials and
method section and the supplementary information. After evolving
separately for a certain time t 5 T, all groups are merged (group
merging), and the cycle restarts by forming new groups according to
the current fraction of cooperators, x, in the whole population. It is
the interplay of these three steps, characterized by the initial group
size, n0, the selection strength, s, and the regrouping time, T,w h i c h
determines the long-term evolution of the population.
Results
Fig. 2A shows the time evolution of the overall fraction of coopera-
tors during a group evolution step. We find three distinct scenarios:
decrease (red), transient increase (green), and permanent increase of
cooperation (blue). Their origin can be ascribed to two ecological
mechanisms: more cooperative groups grow faster (group-growth
mechanism) and purely cooperative groups can reach a larger car-
rying capacity (group-fixation mechanism).
Apermanentincreaseofcooperationcanbeexplainedonthebasis
of the group-fixation mechanism: for asymptotically long times the
intra-group evolution reaches a stationary state, where each group
consist solely of either cooperators or free-riders. Which state is
favored depends on the interplay between selection pressure and
stochastic effects. Because cheaters have a relative fitness advantage,
they tend to outcompete cooperators in groups with a mixed initial
composition. However, there are two stochastic effects leading to
purely cooperative groups. First, the stochastic process of group
formation results in a distribution of group compositions also con-
taining a fraction of groups which consist of cooperators only.
Second, random drift
57,58, which is most pronounced during a popu-
lation bottleneck where group sizes are small, can cause a group to
become fixed in a state with cooperators only. Due to the benefit of
cooperators for the whole group, these purely cooperative groups
reach a much higher carrying capacity than those left without any
cooperator. Hence, although inferior in terms of number of groups,
purely cooperative groups through their large group size contribute
with a large statistical weight to the total composition of the popu-
lation, and thereby ensure maintenance or even increase of the level
of cooperation for long times, cf. Fig. 2A blue curve.
Inorderforthegroup-fixationmechanismtobecomeeffectivethe
evolutionary dynamics has to act for time scales longer than the
selection time, ts: 5 1/s, which measures the time scale on which
selectionacts.Forsmallertimes,atemporaryincreaseincooperation
level is observed provided the initial group size is small enough, cf.
Fig. 2A. The initial rise is caused by the group-growth mechanism
duringthegrowthphaseofcolonies,seeFig.2C.Givenadistribution
of initial group compositions, it asymmetrically amplifies the size of
Figure 1 | Repetitivecycleofpopulationdynamics. Thetimeevolutionof
apopulationcomposedofcooperators(blue)andfree-riders(red)consists
ofthreecyclicallyrecurringsteps.Groupformationstep:weconsiderawell-
mixed population which is divided into M separate groups (i 5 1, …, M)
by an unbiased stochastic process such that the initial group size and the
fraction of cooperation vary statistically with mean values n0 and x0,
respectively. Group evolution step: groups grow and evolve separately and
independently; while the fraction of cooperators decrease within each
group, cooperative groups grow faster and can reach a higher carrying
capacity. Group merging step: after a regrouping time, T, all groups are
merged together again. With the ensuing new composition of the total
population, the cycle starts anew.
www.nature.com/scientificreports
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strongerwithabroaderdistribution,or,equivalently,asmallerinitial
groupsizen0.Eventuallytheinitialrisehastodeclinesince,duetothe
internalselectionadvantageoffree-riders,thefractionofcooperators
isalwaysdecreasing withineach mixed group.Asaconsequence, the
overall benefit of cooperators through faster growth of more coop-
erative groups is only transient. After a certain time, the cooperation
time, tc, the fraction of cooperators, x(t), falls again below its initial
value, x0, unless the group-fixation mechanism is strong enough to
ensure a permanent increase. Finally, if group-internal selection
is too strong compared with the growth advantage of cooperative
groups, the level of cooperation cannot increase even transiently, cf.
Fig. 2A, red curve.
Combining all three steps of the cycle we now ask for the evolu-
tionary outcome after many iterations, k, of the cycle. For very small
bottlenecks, n0 # 3, both the groupfixation and the group-growth
mechanismresultinaapurelycooperativepopulationandcannotbe
distinguished.ThisisshowninFig.3Aforparameterscorresponding
to the experiments by Chuang et al.
29; the experimental results and
the results of our stochastic model are in excellent agreement. For
larger bottlenecks, n0 5 5, and depending on the relative magnitude
of the regrouping time T, we find two fundamentally distinct scen-
arios, see Fig. 3B. For large regrouping times, T ? ts, there is a
threshold value, x
u, for the initial cooperator fraction, x0, above
which cooperators take over the whole population and below which
they go extinct. In contrast, for regrouping times smaller than the
selection time, T # ts, independent of the initial value, x0, the popu-
lationreachesastationarystatewherecooperatorsareinstablecoex-
istence with free-riders. As explained next, these two scenarios are
closelytiedtothegroup-growthandgroup-fixationmechanisms;for
an illustration see the supplementary videos. The threshold value for
maintenance of cooperation at large regrouping times is a con-
sequence of group-fixation and the larger carrying capacityof purely
cooperative groups. Since for T ? ts the intra-group dynamics has
reached astationary state, fixation leaves the population with groups
consisting of either cooperators or defectors only. The probability of
fixation in the respective state and hence the fraction of purely coop-
erative groups after completing one cycle strongly depends on the
initial cooperator fraction. Now, if the initial cooperator fraction
becomes too low, the number of cooperative groups will be too rare
such that even their larger maximum group size is no longer suf-
ficientforthemtogainsignificantweightinthetotalpopulation,and
the overall cooperator fraction in the population will decline. Thus
there must be a critical value for the cooperator fraction, x
u, below
which, upon iterating the cycle the fraction of cooperators will
decline more and more, see Fig. 3B (red line). In contrast, above
the critical value purely cooperating groups are becoming more fre-
quent upon regrouping, and therefore cooperators will eventually
take over the population completely, cf. Fig. 3B (blue line).
Whengroupsaremerged during the phaseoftransientincrease of
cooperation, T # ts, the stationary level of cooperation does not
depend on the initial one. This behavior is due to the dependence
of the change of the cooperator fraction during one cycle, Dx, on the
initialfraction,x0asdiscussedinthefollowing;seealsoFig.2B.Aswe
have already eluded to in the discussion of the group-growth mech-
anism, stochasticity during group formation and during the initial
neutral phase of the group evolution dynamics results in a broad
distribution of group compositions. The evolutionary dynamics is
acting on this distribution in an antagonistic fashion. While, due to
the higher growth rate of more cooperative groups, the distribution
develops a positive skew leading to an increase in the average overall
cooperation, the group-internal selection pressure is counteracting
this effect by reducing the cooperator fraction within each group.
The relative strength of the former effect is largest for small initial
cooperator fraction since this allows the largest positive skew to
develop. Hence, for a given regrouping time, if the change in overall
cooperator fraction Dx is positive for small x0 it must become nega-
tive for sufficiently large x0, as illustrated in Fig. 2B. For a more
detailed mathematical discussion of these effects we refer to the
supplementary information. As a consequence, in populations with
Figure 2 | Evolutionwhileindividualsarearrangedingroups(group-evolutionstep). (A)Populationaverage ofcooperatorfraction,x,asafunctionof
time t. Depending on the average initial group size, n0, three different scenarios arise: decrease of cooperation (red line, n0 5 30), transient increase of
cooperation (green line, n0 5 6, increase until cooperation time tc) and permanently enhanced cooperation (blue line, n0 5 4). These three scenarios arise
fromtheinterplayoftwomechanisms.Whilethegroup-growthmechanism,duetofastergrowthofmorecooperativegroups,cancauseamaximuminthe
fractionofcooperatorsforshorttimes,thegroup-fixationmechanism,duetoalargermaximumsizeofpurelycooperativegroups,assurescooperationfor
large times. Both mechanisms become less efficient with increasing initial group sizes and are not effective in the deterministic limit (dashed black line,
solutionofEq.(S7)forN056)asthe relyon fluctuations. (B) Thestrengthofthe group-growth mechanism decreaseswith anincreasing initial fraction
ofcooperators. This is illustrated by comparing the time evolution for three different initial fractions of cooperators and a fixed initial group size n0 5 5.
After a fixed time, here t 5 3.03, the fraction of cooperators is larger than the initial one for x0 5 0.2, equal to it for x0 5 0.5, and eventually becomes
smaller than the initial value, as shown for x0 5 0.8. (C) Change of the average group size, n 5 Sivi /M. At the beginning the groups grow exponentially,
whiletheylatersaturatetotheirmaximumgroupsize.Asthismaximumsizedependsonthefractionofcooperators,theaveragegroupsizedeclineswith
thelossinthelevelofcooperation (n056,green line).Thedeterministic solution forthesame setofparameters whichdoesnot accountforfluctuations
(dashed black line, solution of Eq. (S7)) describes this behavior qualitatively. s 5 0.1, p 5 10.
www.nature.com/scientificreports
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quency. At the same time, when the initial fraction of cooperators
is low, they also increase in number, finally leading to stable coexist-
ence of cooperators and defectors at some fraction x
s. This stationary
fraction of cooperators is independent of the starting fraction and
solely determined by the parameters of the evolutionary dynamics.
Theinterplayofboththegroup-growthandgroup-fixationmech-
anismleads,dependingontheregroupingtime,todifferentscenarios
forthelevelsofcooperation.Thesearesummarizedinthebifurcation
diagram Fig. 3C, where the stable and unstable fixed points of the
regrouping dynamics, x
s and x
u, are shown as functions of the
regrouping time. The scenarios can be classified according to their
stability behavior under regrouping as follows: For large regrouping
times, T ? ts, the group-fixation mechanism leads to bistable beha-
vior. With decreasing T, the fixation mechanism loses ground while
the group-growth mechanism becomes more prominent. There is a
intermediate scenario: the dynamics is bistable with full cooperation
as well as coexistence as stable fixed points. For even smaller times,
only the group-growth mechanism remains effective and the rare
strategy here always outperforms the common one such that each
strategy can invade but not overtake the other: coexistence. Finally,
for T = ts, cooperators always take over the population, effectively
leading to purely cooperative populations.
Discussion
In this article, we have studied the influence of population dynamics
and fluctuations on the evolution and maintenance of cooperation.
We specifically account for alternating population bottlenecks and
phases of microbial growth. Thereby, our model serves as a null-
model for cooperation in rearranging populations
25,26,28,29,31, e.g. dur-
ing microbial and parasitic life-cycles
24,41,59–61, and bacterial biofilm
formation
24,34–37. The final outcome of the dynamics depends on
the interplay between the time evolution of size and composition of
each subpopulation. While a growth advantage of more cooperative
groups favors cooperators, it is counteracted by the evolutionary
advantage of free-riders within each subpopulation. We have inves-
tigated the stochastic population dynamics and the ensuing correla-
tions between these two opposing factors. Depending on whether
groups are merged while they are still exponentially growing or
already in the stationary phase, two qualitatively different mechan-
isms are favored, the group-growth and the group-fixation mech-
anism.Importantly,ouranalysisidentifiesdemographicnoiseasone
of the main determinants for both mechanisms. First, demographic
noise during population bottlenecks creates a broad distribution in
the relative abundance of cooperators and free-riders within the set
of subpopulations. The growth advantage of more cooperative sub-
populationsimpliesanasymmetricamplificationof fluctuationsand
possibly yields to an increase of cooperation in the whole population
(group-growth mechanism). Our analysis shows that this can enable
a single cooperative mutant to spread in the population which then,
mediated by the dynamics, reaches a stationary state with coexisting
cooperators and free-riders. Second, if the founder populations con-
tain only very few individuals, demographic fluctuations strongly
enhance the fixation probability of each subpopulation which then
consistsofcooperatorsorfree-ridersonly.Purelycooperativegroups
can reach a much higher carrying capacity. However, only if the
relative weight of purely cooperative groups is large enough, this
effect leads to an increase in the level of cooperation in the whole
population (group-fixation mechanism). From our theoretical ana-
lysis of the population dynamics we conclude this to be the case only
if the initial fraction of cooperators is above some threshold value.
As shown by comparison with experiments by Chuang et al.
29 the
proposed model is able to describe microbial dynamics quantita-
tively.Moreover,ourmodelmakespredictionshowtheevolutionary
outcome varies depending on population dynamics and bottlenecks,
and how the discussed mechanisms can provoke cooperation. These
predictions can be tested experimentally by new experiments similar
tothoseofChuangetal.andothers
25,26,28,29,31:Forexample,byvarying
easilyaccessibleparameterslikethebottlenecksizen0ortheregroup-
ing time T, the relative influence of both mechanisms can be tuned.
Then the resulting level of cooperation and the ensuing bifurcation
diagrams can be quantitatively compared with our theoretical pre-
dictions.
As we assume the worst case scenario for cooperators, e.g ran-
domlyformedgroupsandnoadditionalassortment,ourfindingsare
robust: The discussed pathways towards cooperation based on a
growth-advantage of more cooperative groups and restructuring
Figure 3 | Evolution of the overall cooperator fraction under repeated
regrouping. Aftermanyiterations,k,oftheevolutionarycycle,astationary
levelofcooperation isreached.(A)Forsmallpopulationbottlenecks, n0#
3, group-growth and group-fixation mechanisms are effective and lead to
purely cooperative populations. Growth parameters, bottleneck size and
the regrouping time are chosen according to the experiments by Chuang
et al.
29, see supplementary information. Without any fitting parameters,
our simulation results (colored lines) are in good agreement with the
experimental data (black points). (B) For larger bottlenecks, n0 5 5, and
depending on the relative efficiency of the group-growth and group-
fixation mechanism, two qualitatively different regimes can be
distinguished. While the group-growth mechanism leads to stable
coexistenceofcooperatorsandfree-riders(greenlines),thegroup-fixation
mechanismcanleadtoapurestateofeitheronlycheaters(redline)oronly
cooperators (blue line). The relative impact of these mechanisms depends
stronglyontheregroupingtimeT.Forshortregroupingtimes(Tshort52.5
, ts, green lines), the group-growth mechanism is effective, while for
sufficiently long regrouping times (Tlong 5 20 . ts, blue and red lines) the
group-fixation mechanism acts more strongly. (C) With parameters equal
to (B), the detailed interplay of the group-growth and group-fixation
mechanisms is summarized in a bifurcation diagram showing the
stationary levels of cooperation as a function of the regrouping time T.
Depending of the relative efficiency of both mechanism, four different
regimes arise: pure cooperation, coexistence, intermediate, and bistability.
The times Tshort and Tlong correspond to the green and red/blue lines
shown in (B). Parameters are x0 5 0.086, T 5 3.1, s 5 0.05 and p 5 6.6 in
(A);seealsosupplementaryinformation.In(B),x05{0.1(green),x050.9
(green)} and x0 5 {0.5 (red), x0 5 0.6 (blue)} for Tshort 5 2.5 and Tlong 5
20, respectively. s 5 0.1 and p 5 10 in (B/C).
www.nature.com/scientificreports
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logical factors like positive assortment, spatial arrangements of
groups, mutation, or migration
1.
Shown by our analysis, a regular life-cycle favors cooperation.
Besides better nutrient exploitation, this advantage for cooperation
might be one reason for the evolution of more complex, controlled
life-cycles including collective motion of microbes, local lysis, and
sporulation
24,34–37.
Methods
We used a stochastic, individual-based model where each individual is either a
cooperator or a free-rider. In the group formation step groups are formed at random.
The initial group size, n0,i, is Poisson distributed (with mean n0). Given this size, the
fraction of cooperators j0,i follows by a binomial distributed number of cooperators.
During the evolution step, each individual is subject to random birth and death
events. The dynamics is given by a time-continuos Markov process where the change
of the probability, htP(ni, ji; t), is given by a master equation. In detail, the basal per
capita birthrateof eachindividual depends linearly onthe grouplevel ofcooperation
ji, while the per capita death rate increases linearly with the group size ni the indi-
vidual belong to. In addition, free-riding individuals have a higher birth-rate where
the strength of selection s measures the advantage of free-riding individuals. Full
detailsaregiveninthesupplementaryinformation.Thetimescaleissuchthatasmall
population of only free-riders initially grows exponentially with the average size ni,0
exp t. To investigate the dynamics and both evolutionary mechanisms we performed
extensivecomputersimulationsbyemployingtheGillespiealgorithm
62.Groupsizeis
M 5 5 ? 10
3 in Fig. 2, and M 5 5 ? 10
4 in Fig. 3.
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